BEPA monthly brief, Issue 41, November 2010 by Missiroli, Antonio & Therace, Aurelie
 
 
Editor: Antonio Missiroli (Tel. 84147) 
Assistant: Aurélie Therace  
(Tel. 64925) 
Disclaimer: The views expressed in 
the BEPA Monthly do not necessarily 




bepa monthly brief 
November 2010- Issue 41 
EDITORIAL  
By Antonio Missiroli 
 
One year on – and moving on  
 
The first anniversary of the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
occurs at a difficult time for the EU. 
The new institutional arrangements 
inaugurated one year ago are still 
being tested and implemented 
(BEPA has just published a 
dedicated analysis on that). 
Meanwhile Europe’s agenda is 
completely hijacked by the side 
effects of the financial and economic 
crisis on some euro zone countries, 
which risk undermining the EMU 
and casting doubts over the entire 
integration process. 
Ironically, also one year after the 
Copenhagen Conference and at the 
start of the Cancun summit, the 
Lisbon Treaty has been hit by 
“climate change”. What has changed 
is not only the political mood across 
the Union – at least as compared to 
the general climate in which the core 
elements of the new treaty were 
negotiated and agreed in 2003/04 – 
but also the set of priorities that now 
dominate EU policy-making (and 
may even impose, in turn, further 
treaty revisions). 
Let us be clear: the ratification of 
Lisbon has already contributed to 
making the Union more cohesive 
and effective, and some new 
provisions have already proved their 
worth. Let us just try and imagine 
what impact the debt crises of 2010 
would have had if the Treaty had not 
been in place yet! And it is a fact that 
a number of deliberations on 
enhanced financial and fiscal 
supervision by EU bodies would 
probably never have been agreed 
without the turmoil created by those 
crises.  
But it is also a fact that the decisions 
taken recently as well as those that 
are about to be taken on EU 
economic governance – to which 
BEPA, in cooperation with DG 
ECFIN, will devote an international 
conference in January – usher in a 
brand new stage of the integration 
process: they represent a completion 
of  Maastr icht ’ s  “unf in ished 
b u s i n e s s ”  r a t h e r  t h a n  a n 
implementation of Lisbon’s ongoing 
job. 
Besides, this first anniversary marks 
also the launch of one of the key 
innovations of the new Treaty, 
namely the European External 
Action Service (EEAS). Its creation 
has required additional negotiations 
both among and between the 
Member States and EU institutions, 
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culminating with the “quadrilogue” agreement of 
last June, the Council Decision of late July and 
the subsequent co-decision procedure on 
budgetary and staff regulations finalised this 
autumn. The first nucleus of the new service is 
starting its activity in the forthcoming weeks, 
with a view to reaching its full operational 
capacity gradually. The EEAS (likely to become 
HRVP Catherine Ashton’s fourth “hat”, if one 
considers chairing the Foreign Affairs 
Committee is the third one) is indeed bound to 
be a work in progress, not unlike the other 
institutional innovations enshrined in the new 

























Commission’s Legal Service, will devote another 
international Conference in February. 
If the past year has been full of unexpected 
developments, the past month has offered also 
opportunities to review partnerships and policies 
that are much less driven by short-term 
considerations. It was the case with the EU-US 
summit held in Lisbon and, above all, the 
Commission’s usual reports on the candidates 
for EU accession. This issue of BEPA Monthly 
addresses these from a strategic perspective and 
offers some additional food for thought on how 
to develop them further even in the current  
(changing) climate. 
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President Barack Obama made a telling remark 
at the conclusion of our EU-US summit in 
Lisbon. With the long list of summits he had just 
attended in Lisbon (and before that in Asia) in 
mind, the US President told reporters: “This 
summit was not as exciting as other summits, 
because we basically agree on everything.” The 
US, he said, “has no closer partner than 
Europe.” 
The President was right. This was by no means a 
headline grabbing summit. We saw no 
fundamental clash of values. No lines drawn in 
the sand. Any political posturing was left at the 
door and instead we saw leaders with a “get-
down-to-business” attitude willing to engage on 
everything from counter-terrorism to economic 
recovery, development aid, and a number of 
foreign policy issues. It was a meeting of best 
friends. Having attended many such gatherings 
in recent years, I can personally testify to its 
intimate, informal, and friendly nature. 
The EU-US relationship is not dramatic for a 
very simple reason: it works. It is not a zero-sum 
or transactional relationship but a 
complementary one, based on shared goals and 
values. I would not say that we agree on every 
single issue, nor would I deny that we sometimes 
diverge in both the analysis and the remedies. 
But we agree to discuss areas of concern and to 
find common ground, because we know that 
acting together is inherently valuable to both 
sides.  
To start with, we agree on the need to ensure 
strong, balanced and sustainable economic 
growth to create jobs on both sides of the 
Atlantic. We agree about the importance of 
jointly addressing global challenges such as 
climate change and international development. 
And we agree that we must work closely together 
to strengthen our mutual security. All of these 
elements were discussed during the summit, the 
first of its kind since the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty. And all of these are areas of 
broad cooperation in our day-to-day work, and 
represent cornerstones in our common agenda. 
As we have seen during the global financial 
crisis, no country is immune from the forces of 
international economics, and it is vital that the 
European Union and the United States work 
together to address the causes of this turbulence. 
During the summit, leaders focused on ways to 
fully tap the potential of transatlantic commerce 
to boost growth and generate jobs on both sides 
of the Atlantic, a common strategic approach to 
correcting the imbalances in our economies, and 
creating convergence on financial reform 
agendas. 
The summit was also an opportunity for the 
leaders of Europe and the United States to 
reiterate their mutual commitments to free trade, 
and they acknowledged that protectionism would 
only lead to a further economic downturn. They 
agreed to ensure that the transatlantic economies 
and markets remain open to the powerful forces 
of innovation; that the free flow of transatlantic 
ideas, products and services continues; and that 
our companies have the most extensive access 
possible to each other’s markets. This agenda 
will be to the benefit of all our citizens and 
businesses. 
The EU-US relationship is also about the 
deepening of our partnership on a wide range of 
security issues that affect citizens on both sides 
of the Atlantic. Our leaders agreed during the 
summit that respect for fundamental rights and 
freedoms and joint efforts to strengthen security 
cooperation, in particular in the face of 
terrorism, are mutually reinforcing. 
New developments in our bilateral relations and 
on the global stage have created an impetus for 
new institutions for cooperation, such as the 
Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), the EU-
US Energy Council, and the EU-US 
Development Dialogue. Each of these 
institutions, in their own way, will allow us to 
work even closer on ambitious and highly 
1 Another Lisbon: assessing the EU-US summit 
By João Vale de Almeida* 
* João Vale de Almeida is Ambassador and Head of the Delegation of the European Union in Washington. 
bepa monthly brief 
November 2010- Issue 41 
4 
complex goals, such as harmonizing regulatory 
regimes; opening transatlantic markets; 
cooperating on stable, reliable, and transparent 
global energy markets; and ensuring synergy 
between the aid delivered by the United States 
and the European Union, which combined 
amounts to 80 per cent of the world’s official 
development assistance annually. 
While high-level summits like the one in Lisbon 
are important opportunities to highlight the 
relationship, the most important aspect is that 
they provide the political impulse for day-to-day 
work across the full range of policy issues. The 
underlying reality is illustrated by the following: 
• Despite the recession, the United States and 
Europe remain each other's most important 
foreign commercial markets. No other 
commercial relationship is as integrated as the 
transatlantic economy, and estimates show 
that it generates over $4 trillion in total 
commercial sales every year and employs up 
to 14 million workers on both sides of the 
Atlantic; 
• Trade between the European Union and the 
United States amounts to roughly $1 billion 
every day, and only a very small percentage of 
transatlantic trade deals lead to disagreements 
or disputes; 
• We increasingly cooperate on fighting 
terrorism and transnational crime, combating 
piracy, corruption, and intellectual property 
violations. We share strategic objectives on 
the most important foreign policy issues and 
cooperate closely to search for diplomatic 
solutions. 
In short, the relationship does not need special 
attention, but it does need constant 
commitment.  
The Lisbon EU-US Summit re-affirmed that 
commitment. It was an important showcase for 
the comprehensive relationship between the 
European Union and the United States, which is 
in the process of adapting to changing global 
realities.   
The Lisbon Treaty is an important step in this 
development. The Treaty itself is still in the 
implementation phase, and both Europe and the 
US expect a lot from it – and rightfully so. It will 
strengthen both the internal and external 
mechanisms and capabilities of the EU. And, 
most importantly, it will enable the European 
Union and the United States to work even more 
closely together on a results-oriented agenda to 
address the critical challenges of the 21st century.  
After the Lisbon Summit, we are even better 
equipped to do so in the coming years. 
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A few weeks ago the Commission published its 
autumn enlargement “package” – i.e. its regular 
reports on the applicant countries and its strategy 
paper. It is fair to say that, although this year’s 
reports registered modest progress in some 
cases, neither they nor the strategy paper 
included big surprises or launched important 
initiatives. This comment is not a criticism: to 
observe that “business as usual” is now the case 
for enlargement policy is simply a recognition 
that it has become more like an “ordinary” EU 
policy, during a period when the priority is to 
deal with problems and crises in other areas. 
I must declare a personal interest: I worked for 
33 years in the Commission in various fields 
including enlargement, and in fact I first became 
involved in enlargement more than 40 years ago 
when I was a junior member of the British 
negotiating team for accession to the European 
Communities. Personally I find it difficult to 
consider enlargement policy as a “normal” 
policy. It is surely one of the most fascinating 
areas of the EU’s activity – not only foreign 
policy, but more than foreign policy – and, more 
than a policy, it is a process: the extraordinary 
process by which new members join the Union, 
and the “external” becomes “internal”. 
One of the enduring characteristics of the EU’s 
enlargement policy is that it is reactive rather 
than proactive. Expansion takes place because 
neighbouring countries knock on the EU’s door, 
not because the institutions send out 
missionaries to find new members. On the 
contrary, it commonly sends to non-members 
the message “do not apply for membership – at 
least, not yet”. The fact that so many countries 
want to join – at present we have 9 prospective 
members officially in the queue – is a tribute to 
the magnetism of European integration. But the 
fact that the moving force comes from outside, 
rather than inside, has important consequences 
for the dynamics of the process. The EU’s 
position tends to be defensive and even self-
protective. For example, the Copenhagen criteria 
of 1993, which have become a biblical text for 
enlargement, were not designed in a spirit of 
evangelism but as a means of risk-avoidance. 
The EU leaders defined conditions to avoid 
bringing in countries with disruptive political and 
economic problems. 
Between past and future  
The situation of enlargement policy today is not 
so different from what it has been in the past. 
We are faced by a large number of applicants or 
potential applicants (Turkey, Croatia, 
Macedonia/FYROM, Montenegro, Serbia, 
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Iceland) 
and we say to them “yes, you can join the EU 
but only when you fulfil the criteria for 
membership”. But of course there are significant 
differences compared with the past, and the 
most important in my view are the following. 
First, the realisation that recent enlargements 
were not sufficiently well prepared (and 
particularly the 2007 enlargement) has led the 
EU to apply the membership criteria more 
rigorously. This approach is prudent and 
necessary, but it needs to be handled with care, 
and with a kind of “reciprocal rigour”. If the 
coherence and credibility of the EU’s 
enlargement policy requires it to insist on respect 
of the accession criteria, it must also respond 
positively to progress made by prospective 
members. 
Another problem with the rigorous approach is a 
temptation to apply the same rules and procedures 
uniformly to all applicant countries without taking 
account of their material situation: a “one-size-fits-
all” approach which ignores the principle of 
differentiation. I encountered this problem recently 
during a visit to Iceland where they have the 
impression that some actors in the EU want 
Iceland to set up the administrative structures for 
applying all EU rules not at the time of accession 
but as a pre-condition of concluding accession 
2 EU enlargement: what next? 
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negotiations. While this may be desirable for 
countries with a weak administrative capacity, it 
cannot be necessary in the case of a long-standing 
member of the European Economic Area. 
Second, in the case of the Western Balkans, 
geography and history have induced a more 
proactive role on the part of the EU and a sense 
of shared responsibility among European 
leaders. The international community says “how 
can the EU expect to be credible as a global 
actor unless it can solve these problems in its 
own back-yard?” 
This syndrome means that the mix between 
foreign policy (what pertains to the period before 
accession) and enlargement policy (what pertains to 
the period after enlargement, and the need to 
ensure well-prepared accessions) is particularly 
difficult to manage. After the accession of 
Croatia, perhaps in 2013, the EU politics of the 
Western Balkans will become even more 
complex as the other countries in the region 
become nervous about their accession. Some are 
already arguing for a “simplified” approach 
under which all the remaining Balkan countries 
would join the EU at the same time. But such an 
approach, which would undermine the 
conditionality of the accession process and 
weaken the leverage for good preparation, would 
be a recipe for failure. 
Turkey – another discourse 
Thirdly, in the case of Turkey, the EU’s 
discourse is not “yes, you can join the EU but 
only when you fulfil the conditions for 
membership”. It is “yes, we want you to fulfil the 
conditions, but we are not sure about your 
membership”.  
Turkey is by far the most difficult challenge that 
the EU has ever faced in the field of 
enlargement, and this is partly because it is the 
biggest country that has ever applied for 
membership. Although its population is smaller 
today than that of Germany, it is expected to 
increase and to stabilise somewhere around 90 
million: so, if and when it joins, it will be the 
biggest member. Opposition to Turkey’s 
membership exists in many member states. In 
public opinion this opposition is related to the 
idea that Turkey is not geographically part of 
Europe, to the fact that the majority of its 
population is Muslim, and to the fear of 
immigration from Turkey. In mentioning these 
motives I am not justifying them: they are in 
some ways irrational, but nevertheless they are 
widely felt. At the political level, hostility to 
Turkish membership is voiced not only by 
extremists but by mainstream parties in several 
member states – including France and Germany. 
These are very serious obstacles to Turkish 
membership. Although it is true that political 
parties can modify their position on Turkey (as 
France’s Socialists have done), it is not evident that 
the “irrational” attitudes of the public can be 
changed, even in the long term. Even if accession 
negotiations are concluded with Turkey and a 
treaty is signed, there is a strong probability that 
France and other member states would subject its 
ratification to referendums, and the result would be 
“No”. In reality, the hypothesis of an accession 
treaty is very distant, since a number of member 
states will not allow the negotiations to conclude: 
France, for example, refuses to agree the opening 
of a number of chapters because they concern 
policies that are central to EU membership. 
Personally, I regret that the EU decided to open 
negotiations with Turkey in a situation where 
several member states expressed their opposition 
to its membership. Accession negotiations are 
not about bilateral relations between the EU and 
Turkey – between “them” and “us” – but about 
the organisation of a “future us” which includes 
Turkey. One should not engage in such 
negotiations if they are based on a false premise.  
Since they have been opened, however, the problem 
for the EU now is how to pursue them. Some 
commentators argue that “the journey is more 
important than the destination” and that the 
accession process is valuable if it serves to 
“Europeanise” Turkey. This may well be true, but for 
how long can such negotiations continue, particularly 
when there are no more chapters to be opened? 
Neither side wishes at present to break the 
negotiations but – as the risks grow of an impasse, or 
of a crisis in EU/Turkey relations – the prospect 
cannot be ignored. In that case will the EU be able to 
devise a strategy for its future relations with Turkey, 
or will it – in the well-established reactive mode of 
enlargement policy – leave it to Turkey to decide? 
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The annual reports on the countries of the 
Western Balkans just released by the European 
Commission reveal a familiar blend of 
encouraging signs of progress and a long “to-do” 
list: a glass half-full and half-empty.  
In normal circumstances, this might pass as the 
prosaic routine of the pre-accession process. But 
these are not quite “normal circumstances” in 
the EU. The crisis of the euro and the doubts 
about internal cohesion and leadership raise 
concerns as to whether the Union can keep at 
the same time an eye also on the enlargement 
ball. They also reinforce latent doubts in the 
Balkans over the plausibility or the finalité of the 
enlargement agenda. These doubts can only be 
dispelled by strong positive signals coming from 
Brussels now.  
A favourable environment 
There are two ways of assessing the situation in 
the region. One is taking the EU Commission 
progress reports to establish, in true “regatta” 
spirit, a ranking of the march onwards and 
upwards to EU membership.  
Croatia, closest to that goal, is likely to complete 
negotiations next year. At the bottom of the list 
lie Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH) and Kosovo, where 
divided polities and a dysfunctional institutional 
framework account, at least in part, for the 
inability to fight corruption and organised crime. 
As a senior EU representative recently 
commented on BH, this year’s could have been 
called the “non-progress report”.  
The middle group is made of Macedonia/
FYROM, Montenegro and Serbia, with 
shared concerns for the rule of law and 
good governance, but also with progress 
being made in terms of democratisation, 
economic reform and regional cooperation. 
The EU’s belated visa liberalisation was 
certainly the most positive signal sent to the 
people of the region (how could you believe 
in a European future as long as you were 
not allowed to travel there?) although it 
excluded Kosovo.  
The candidate status now granted to Macedonia/
FYROM and Montenegro was refused to 
Albania: not obvious to invite a country where 
last year’s election results have still not been 
recognised by the opposition! But it should now 
be given to Serbia because it is from Belgrade 
that, unexpectedly, come the most encouraging 
changes. 
The other way to assess the situation in the 
region – well beyond progress reports – is to 
consider precisely the huge pro-EU policy shift 
that has occurred in Serbia. In a clear departure 
from the tone and substance of the Kostunica 
government, the Tadic leadership moved in the 
past year from routine pro-European rhetoric to 
actual pro-European policy. After a decade of 
war followed by a decade of stalemate, we have 
now seen a series of concrete steps towards the 
recognition of committed crimes and a U-turn 
on dealing with Kosovo. The speeches given by 
President Tadic during his visits to BH and, 
more recently, Vukovar (Croatia) were explicitly 
meant as part of a reconciliation process with 
Serbia’s neighbours.  
Probably the main persistent obstacle to change 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina is Dodik’s Republika 
Srpska behaving as a state within a state. The 
difference, however, is that Belgrade no longer 
supports its implicit separatism (the same goes 
for Zagreb’s attitude towards the Croats in 
Herzegovina). And a Serbo-Croatian commission 
has been created to deal with the most difficult 
bilateral problems – also a welcome precedent 
for Serbia’s relations with Kosovo.  
Kosovo is indeed where the most significant and 
least expected change has occurred. Belgrade’s 
endorsement of a joint resolution with the EU at 
the UN General Assembly last September 
heralded a fundamental change in dealing with 
Pristina. In the past Kosovo Albanians 
considered the question of status as paramount 
3 Integrating the Balkans: a regional approach  
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while Serbs preferred dealing with technical 
issues. After Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence in February 2008 there was a 
reversal of roles: Belgrade considered status talks 
as a precondition for solving practical problems 
while Pristina preferred to focus on specifics.  
In September, Belgrade accepted unconditional 
direct talks with Pristina that would primarily 
address the relations of Kosovo Serbs with 
Serbia, but also a series of concrete bilateral 
issues, ranging from customs to energy supply. 
The Serbian shift follows the International Court 
of Justice ruling of 22 July which declared that 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence was not 
in breach of international law. This was a major 
blow to the Serbian position which considered 
that it had a strong legal argument even if 
political realities on the ground were moving in a 
different direction.  
What has happened since could be described as a 
success for the Kosovo institutions but, above 
all, a triumph of pro-EU realism in Serbian 
politics. If the direct talks can start promptly and, 
no less importantly, if the EU provides 
commensurate support and incentives, we may 
be on the verge of overcoming the most difficult 
issue in the Balkans. 
This favourable scenario has been reinforced by 
other factors. Over the last decade US priorities 
have gradually shifted outside Europe, and the 
Balkans now near the bottom of Washington’s 
international list (something not always fully 
appreciated in the region). There is now a strong 
convergence of EU and US policies – as 
opposed to the underlying tensions of the 1990s 
– although there still are occasional differences 
concerning e.g. the assessment of stability in the 
region (particularly Bosnia-Herzegovina) or the 
commitment to prosecute war criminals through 
the ICTY. The EU should now encourage a 
continuing US engagement since it remains 
important particularly for the Bosniaks, Kosovo 
Albanians and Albanians proper, while the prime 
goal of US policy is now precisely to assist in the 
region’s EU accession.  
For its part, Russia had in recent years acquired a 
significant nuisance capability and staged a sort 
of comeback to the region through the Kosovo 
question and energy supply. The consistency of 
the EU position on Kosovo and the “frozen 
conflicts” in the Caucasus has – predictably – 
been questioned by Russia. Initially, Belgrade’s 
approach was to make a deal by giving Moscow a 
stake in its energy sector while relying on Russian 
backing over Kosovo in the UN. After the ICJ 
ruling and Belgrade’s new pragmatism, Russia 
understands it cannot be “more Serbian than the 
Serbs”: obstruction in the Balkans seems thus 
less likely, merely a reminder that the Kosovo 
precedent has implications for pro-Russian 
secessionist enclaves in the Caucasus. 
In short, there is little in today’s policies of the 
key external players that could seriously weaken 
the EU’s position as the “only game in town”. 
Unfinished states... 
Provided, of course, that the enlargement 
“game” for the Western Balkans is actually on. 
There are a number of reasons why the upbeat 
case made above should be nuanced. Some have 
to do with developments in the region, others 
with the lack of political momentum within the 
EU for a sustained enlargement commitment.  
The specific challenge of the EU in the Balkans 
lies in that the European integration prospect is 
vital to the peaceful completion of the process of 
pos t -Yugos l av  na t ion/s ta t e -bu i ld ing . 
“Unfinished states” – as Veton Surroi, Chairman 
of the Foreign Policy Club in Pristina, has called 
them – include Bosnia-Herzegovina (contested 
polity), Kosovo (contested legitimacy), Serbia 
(uncertain borders) and Macedonia/FYROM 
(contested name and identity).  
The shared European roof is meant to help 
defuse contentious territorial and institutional 
issues. To be sure, nobody’s accession should be 
held hostage to the intransigence of one’s 
neighbour. But it seems prudent to make sure 
that “unfinished statehood” issues are settled 
simultaneously during the accession process, 
when EU leverage is strongest. This, in a 
nutshell, is the case for a regional approach to 
enlargement in the Western Balkans. 
Croatia, to start with the frontrunner for EU 
accession, has pending border issues with most 
of its neighbours. The easiest one to solve was 
bepa monthly brief 
November 2010- Issue 41 
9 
Slovenia’s access to international waters, 
although the referendum in Ljubljana was a high-
risk gamble that could have damaged the entire 
process.  
Then there is Macedonia/FYROM’s quest for a 
post-FYROM identity acceptable to its Greek 
neighbour. Greece vetoed the country’s 
accession to NATO in 2008 and there is still 
little indication to date that it intends to be more 
flexible on EU entry. After the experience made 
with Cyprus, however, there should be no new 
EU enlargement without prior resolution of 
pending bilateral conflicts.  
But there is more. The inclusion of Croatia in the 
EU would certainly contribute to the 
stabilisation of its democracy and the rule of law. 
However, its impact on neighbouring Bosnia-
Herzegovina remains debatable as local Croats 
owning Croatian passports en masse (Croatia is 
indeed the only European country with more 
voters than citizens!) are losing interest in the 
future of multi-ethnic BH. 
Similarly, the passports delivered by Romania to 
an estimated 800 000 Moldovans – or by 
Bulgaria (albeit on a much smaller scale) to 
citizens of Macedonia/FYROM – raise questions 
about the nature of citizenship and the 
destabilising effects of EU enlargement on some 
neighbouring countries. 
Finally, Bulgaria and Romania have a direct stake 
in the region’s stability and accession prospects. 
But their rule of law after accession is hardly an 
advertisement for further expansion to the 
Balkans.  
... and unfinished business 
Two conclusions can be drawn from all this:  
1. The pre-accession agenda must focus on 
tackling the question of corruption, clientelism 
(the use of public sector employment for 
political patronage and state capture) and reform 
of the judiciary and public administration;  
2. Moderate nationalists can be made “EU-
compatible”: a few years ago Croatia under 
Sanader paved the way for a process now at 
work in Serbia under Tadic. This emerging 
pragmatism will be essential to resolving bilateral 
disputes and pushing through reforms.  
But both aspects require strong and credible 
movement in the region’s EU accession process. 
And that is precisely what is lacking in an EU 
trying to cope with the effects of the economic 
and financial crisis. The EU’s Agenda 2020 does 
not even mention enlargement. When budget 
cuts are the order of the day and politics is often 
reduced to accountancy, there is little room for 
the boldness, generosity and strategic vision that 
such opening requires. 
No wonder “Europeanisation” looks different 
when seen from Brussels or from the countries 
at the receiving end. This is also where 
“enlargement fatigue” within the EU meets 
“accession fatigue” in the Balkans: we pretend 
we want you, and you pretend you are getting 
ready.  
No less important is the erosion of popular 
support for EU accession: strongest where it is 
least advanced (Albania), weakest where it is 
most advanced (Croatia). According to Gallup 
Balkan Monitor a majority of citizens in all 
candidates believe their country is “heading in 
the wrong direction”. According to the latest poll 
in Croatia, the majority (43% vs. 25%) thinks 
that their country “would not benefit from 
membership”. 
Hence the importance of tackling such 
premature doubts about a process which still has 
a long way to go and cannot succeed without the 
support of the societies concerned. This 
underlines the need for tangible measures that 
citizens can directly identify with “Europe”. Visa 
liberalisation has obviously been the most 
important one, both symbolically and politically.  
Given the Union’s involvement in nation/state-
building in the Balkans, its approach cannot 
simply be a replica of the pattern successfully 
implemented in Central Europe, only a decade 
later. The EU should strengthen the regional 
approach by giving all countries of the region the 
candidate status now plus a date to open 
negotiations. The pace and completion of the 
process will then depend on the capacity to 
deliver by the political elites of each country, 
thus making their respective responsibilities clear 
and the political costs of failure more evident.  
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Arrivées et départs 
Isabelle Ioannides a rejoint le BEPA en tant que 
membre de l’équipe Outreach – Dialogue 
européen en novembre 2010. Elle apporte une 
longue expérience dans le monde universitaire et 
les laboratoires d’idées. 
Nous souhaitons à Antonio Gravili, qui a quitté 
le BEPA pour rejoindre le SPP de la 
DG COMM; et à Elsa Collomp, qui part 
travailler au Secrétariat Général, une bonne 
continuation et les remercions pour leur travail 
au cours de ces années. 
Evénements 
Le 15 novembre, le BEPA a organisé un 
séminaire de discussion avec l’Association 
Européenne de la Pensée Libre (AEPL) afin de 
débattre d’initiatives portant sur le thème de la 
lutte contre la pauvreté et de l’exclusion sociale. 
Ce thème de portée éthique a donné l’occasion 
de rencontrer des représentants d’organisations 
philosophiques et non-confessionnelles. En 
effet, le traité de Lisbonne stipule le maintien 
d’un dialogue ouvert, transparent et régulier avec 
ces églises et organisations (Jean-Claude 
Thébault et le Commissaire Andor ont 
représenté la Commission). 
Le 22 novembre, Ivan Krastev et Jana Kobzova 
du laboratoire paneuropéen d’idées European 
Council for Foreign Relations (ECFR) ont 
présenté leur rapport intitulé The Spectre of a 
Multipolar Europe à des membres du BEPA, du 
Cabinet du Commissaire Füle et du Cabinet de 
Mme Ashton, ainsi qu’à des collègues du 
Secrétariat Général et de la DG RELEX. La 
réunion renforce et reflète l’engagement du 
BEPA de constituer la passerelle nécessaire pour 
un dialogue constant entre la Commission et les 
acteurs externes qui peuvent contribuer 
utilement à l’élaboration des politiques 
européennes.  
Le 24 novembre, Margaritis Schinas et Antonio 
Missiroli du BEPA ont rencontré une délégation 
d’officiels polonais dans le contexte d’une visite 
d’étude organisée à Bruxelles afin de les aider à 
accéder à la meilleure expertise et analyse 
externes. L’objectif de la visite était de discuter 
des ambitions et priorités de la présidence 
polonaise de l’UE en 2011. Lors de la réunion, le 
rôle et les activités du BEPA ont été présentés et 
divers points de vue sur les questions clés qui 
pourraient figurer sur l’agenda politique de la 
présidence polonaise ont été échangés. 
Activités à venir 
Un déjeuner de travail aura lieu le 6 décembre 
rassemblant des membres du BEPA, des 
directeurs généraux de la Commission 
européenne ainsi que des rabbins, des imams et 
autres chefs musulmans importants des Etats 
membres et des Etats-Unis. Cette rencontre vise 
à lancer le débat en faveur de la promotion de 
l’harmonie entre les communautés juives et 
musulmanes et se déroulera autour d’un seul 
menu, symbole du rapprochement entre les 
communautés confessionnelles. 
Le 12 janvier 2011, le BEPA organise 
conjointement avec la DG ECFIN à Bruxelles 
une conférence intitulée “Vers une gouvernance 
économique intégrée dans l’UE: Le semestre 
européen”. Cet événement marquera le début du 
premier semestre européen rassemblant les 
principaux décideurs au sein des institutions 
européennes et ceux des gouvernements et 
parlements nationaux, ainsi que des experts de 
laboratoires d’idées et du milieu universitaire. Le 
Président de la Commission européenne José 
Manuel Barroso et le Commissaire européen aux 
Affaires économiques Olli Rehn présenteront 
leurs points de vue dans les discours d’ouverture 
et de clôture. Des éléments spécifiques du 
nouveau système de gouvernance économique 
intégrée de l’UE, à savoir la surveillance 
financière, macro-structurelle et thématique (en 
vue des objectifs de la stratégie Europe 2020 et 
de ces projets phares) seront abordés dans des 
discussions ciblées. 
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